Wilbur Mawhinney and Ruth E. Mawhinney v. John A. Jensen and Anna Jensen : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1950
Wilbur Mawhinney and Ruth E. Mawhinney v.
John A. Jensen and Anna Jensen : Brief of
Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Glen M. Hatch and B. Z. Kastler, Jr.; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Mawhinney v. Jensen, No. 7537 (Utah Supreme Court, 1950).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1303
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE Q~F UTAH 
WILBUR MAWHINNEY and RUTH 
E. MAWHINNEY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
- vs.-
JOHN A. JENSEN and ANNA 
JENSEN, 
Defendants ana Respondents. 
C·ase No. 
7537 
Appellants' Brief 
F I L E Rl.EN M. HATCH and 
.l.tf. Z. KASTLER, JR. 
J..\u u J ~~~u Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
... _______ ...• ~·-----------· _________ .. o;n,d Appellants. 
'··';;rk, Supreme Court, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
ST ... -\TEMENT OF FACTS ···································-····································· 1 
POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL .......................................... 18 
ARGUMENT ·························----······-··-········-··················································19 
1. The first count in appellants' complaint states a cause of 
action for reformation of the "Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract" and for damages for breach thereof as reformed .................. 19 
2. Appellants' second count states a cause of action in deceit 
against respondents ................................................................................ 35 
3. Appellants' third count states a cause of action for breach 
of warranty against respondents .......................................................... 35 
CONCLUSION ···-·······-·····-----------------------------------------------------------------------------38 
TABLE OF CITATIONS 
Adamson, et ux., vs. Brockbank et al., 185 P. 2d 168 ........................ 20, 29 
Beaver Drug Company vs. Hatch, 61 Utah 597, 217 P. 695 .................. 2.9 
Bennett et al. vs. Bowen et al., 65 Utah ~444, 238 P. 240 .............. 20, 27 
Cram et al., vs. Reynolds et al., 55 Utah 384, 186 P. 100 ................ 19, 23 
Daly vs. Old et al., 99 P. 460 ----··--------·-··········--------·--·-···-------·--------········--··33 
Federal Land Bank of Berkely vs. Salt Lake Valley Sand and 
Gravel Company et al., 89 P. 2d 791 --------------------------------------------·-----23 
Garner vs. Thomas et ai., 78 P. 2d 529 ----------------------------------------·-······20, 23 
George vs. Fritsch Loan and Trust Company, 69 Utah 460, 
256 P. 400 -----------------------------------····---------------------------------------------------------23 
Nielson vs. Hermansen, 166 P. 2d 536 ············-···------------------------------------·--·36 
Nordfors vs. Knight et ux., 60 P. 2d 1115 --------------------------~-------------19, 23 
Rushton vs. Hallett, 8 Utah 277 ----------------------------------------------·················---21 
Strike vs. White et al., 63 P. 2d 600 ----------------------------------------------------------35 
Stuck et al. vs. Delta Land and Water Company, 63 Utah 490, 
227 P. 791 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------20, 21, 25 
TEXTS 
24 Am. Juris. (Fraud and Deceit) Sec. 267 ------------------------········------·-······34 
45 Am. Juris. (Reformation of Instruments) Sec. 7 .............................. 19 
46 Am. Juris. (Sales) Sec. 316 --------------------------------------------------------·····-------37 
46 Am. Juris. (Sales) Sec. 324 ---------------·······----------------------------------------------36 
STATUTES 
Section 81-1-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943 ------------------------------------····----36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILBUR MAWHINNEY and RUTH 
E. MAWHINNEY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
- vs.-
JOHN A. JENSEN and ANN A 
JENSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
7537 
Appellants' Brief 
This is an appeal from the Order of the District 
Court dismissing plaintiffs' case, which Order was based 
upon the sustaining of a General Demurrer to the plain-
tiffs' amended complaint, wherein leave to further 
amend plaintiffs' amended complaint was denied at the 
time the demurrer was sustained. 
The pertinent parts of plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint are a.s follows: 
1. (Allegations as to venue.) 
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2. That on the 14th day of September, 194.6, and 
for many years prior thereto the defendants were the 
owners and operators of the property known as the 
Jensen Hotel, consisting of a restaurant, coffee shop, 
fourteen cabins and a two-story hotel-apartment build-
ing situated in Heber City, County of Wasatch, State 
of Utah; that the defendants thereby had had long 
familiarty with such businesses; that at that time they 
had complete and exclusive knowledge of all of the stock 
therein and the costs thereof; that the plaintiffs were 
newcomers to such businesses and were at said time 
unfamiliar with the conduct of such business, the vol-
ume and rapi~ity of stock turnover, the nature and 
quantity of the stock therein and the cost thereof. 
3. That on or about the 14th day of September, 1946, 
the defendants above named made and entered into a 
written earnest money contract for the purchase of 
that certain restaurant and hotel business with these 
plaintiffs, as follows: 
Salt Lake City, Utah, Sept. 14th, 1946 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT 
RECEIVED FROM W. H. Mawhinney the sum of 
One Thousand Dollars to secure and apply on the pur-
chase of the following described property known as the 
Jensen Hotel, Restaurant, Coffee Shop, 14 cabins, and 
the 2 story apartment house, situated in Heber City, 
Utah. 
For the purchase price of Thirty Five Thousand 
Dollars. 
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The balance of the purchase- price shall be paid as 
follows : Nine Thousand Cash. Balance $200.00 per 
month plus interest on the unpaid balance. 
Interest at 4% per annum on the unpaid portions 
of the purchase price to be included in the prescribed 
payments and possession given Nov. 1st, 1946. 
Property taxes for the current yea.r shall be ad-
justed on pro-rata calendar basis, seller to pay for 
period from January 1st to date of closing, purchaser 
from date of closing to December 31st. Rents, insur-
ance, interest, water and other expenses of said prop-
erty shall be pro-rated as of date of closing. No ex-
ceptions. 
Contr~ct of sale or instrument of conveyance to be 
made on- the approv-ed form of the Salt Lake Real 
Estate Board in the narne of W. H. Mawhinney and 
Ruth E(" Mawhinney.* 
The following items are included in the purchase 
price and are to remain with the property. All stock 
and fixtures no'v on property. 
This payment is made subject to the approval of 
the Seller and unless so approved within 2 days from 
date hereof, the return of the money herein receipted 
shall cancel this sale without damage to the undersigned. 
In the event the prurchaser shall fail to pay the 
balance of said purchase price or complete sarid pur-
chase as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon 
shall, at the option of the Seller, be retained as liqui-
dated and agreed damages.* 
It is understood and agreed that the terms written 
in this receipt constitute the entire Preliminary Con-
tract between the Buyer and Seller and that no verbal 
statements made by a representative of the Agent rela-
tive to this transaction shall be construed to be a part 
of this transaction unless incorporated in writing herein. 
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It is further agreed that the execution of final transfer 
papers -abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt. 
The Seller agrees in consideration of the efforts of 
the agent in procuring a purchaser to pay said agent 
the rate of commission as established by the Salt Lake 
Real Estate Board. 
Brockbank Realty Co. 
(s) L. B. Pearson, Agent 
We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill the 
terms and conditions on the above receipt specified, the 
seller agreeing to furnish a good marketable title wit;h 
abstract to date, or policy of title insurance at the option 
of the seller and to make final conveyance by sufficient 
deed. If either party fails so to do, he agrees to pay 
the expenses of enforcing this agreement, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
/s/ J. A. Jensen 
/s/ Anna Jensen 
/s/ W. H. Mawhinney 
/s/ Ruth E. Mawhinney 
Together with all stock and fixtures now on the 
above described premises. 
*Italics ours. 
4. That at the time of making said agreement, 
and as an inducement to the plaintiffs to enter into 
said agreement for the purchase price stated therein, the 
plaintiffs examined the stock, merchandise, fixtures, 
premises and other items and accessories on said prem-
ises in the company of the defendant, John A. Jensen and 
the defendants' agent L. B. Pearson and was informed 
by the defendant John A. Jensen, that all the said items 
were included in the aforesaid contract and were to be 
conveyed by said contract. 
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5. That at the time of making said agreement it 
was agreed that on the 1st day of November, 1946, the 
defendants would relinquish possession of the said prent-
ises and iten1s of personal property to the plaintiffs 
and at or before that time a uniform real estate contract 
would be executed by the parties in furtherance of the 
agreement reached by the parties at the time of the 
execution of the aforesaid earnest money agreement. 
That the parties agreed that the defendants might use 
from the stock on s-ai4 premises during the period be-
tween September 14th, 1946 and the time of the relin-
quishment of possession to the plaintiffs, but that the 
defendants would replace all the stock or any other 
items on the said premises which they might use. 
6. That on or about the 17th day of September, 
1946, and again on or about the 23rd day of September, 
1946, the plaintiff Wilbur Mawhinney went to the prem-
ises in question by app.ointment with defendant John 
A. Jensen for the purpose of inventorying the said 
premises; that on each of these occasions he requested 
the defendant John A. Jensen to permit him, the plain-
tiff Wilbur Mav.rhinney, to make a written inventory 
of all the items of personal property and fixtures which 
were the subject of the above-mentioned contract be-
t\veen these parties; that on each of the said occasions, 
the defendant John A. Jensen informed the plaintiff 
Wilbur l\fawhinney that he was too busy and did not 
have the time to conduct an inventory with him on 
that date; that he would not allo"v Wilbur Mawhinney 
to take it except with him; that in consequence hereof, 
the plaintiffs were never able to obtain a full, accurate 
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inventory of the personal property and fixtures which 
were to have passed by virtue of the said agreement. 
7. That on or about the 23rd day of September, 
1946, while plaintiff Wilbur Mawhinney was waiting 
on the premises in question to conduct the inventory with 
the defendants, he was able to list portions of the per-
sonal property on said premises, but was not able to· 
list those items of stock and other personal property 
which are described in Paragraph 10 below, because 
he was denied access by the defendant John A. Jensen 
to the places where these items were stored. 
8. That on the 28th day of October, 1946, the plain-
tiffs and the defendants assembled for the execution 
of their uniform real estate contract in the lobby of the 
hotel premises, the subject of the said contract; and at 
this time the plaintiff Wilbur Mawhinney demanded 
of defendant John A. Jensen that the said defendant 
then and there permit him to inspect the premises and 
inventory the balance of the stock in order that he 
might knovv, before executing the real estate contract, 
that all of the stock which was on hand at the time 
of the execution of the earnest money agreement was 
still there or had been replaced. 
9. That at this time, the defendant John A. Jensen 
refused to permit the plaintiffs to enter upon his prem-
ises for the purpose of making such inventory; that he 
refused to go with them to make such inventory; that 
he indicated that he was greatly offended and insulted 
that the plaintiffs should question his word or feel 
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that an inventory 'vas necessary at this time; and that he 
informed the plaintiffs that all of the stock which was 
on the pre1uises at the time of the execution of the 
earnest money agreement ""'as still there or had been 
replaced, so that the quantities were the same at this 
time as they had been at time of the execution of the 
earnest n1oney agreement; that at said time the plain-
tiffs 'vere bound by s·a.id earnest money agreement to 
execute the uniform real estate contract and would have 
been in default thereunder if they had refused to exe-
cute san1e; that at said time and at s•a.id previous times 
referred to in Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 herein, plaintiffs 
were prevented by the tricks and artifices of the defend-
ant John A. Jensen from obtaining a true inventory 
of stock on said premises; that the plaintiffs thereupon 
signed the uniform real estate contract, the pertinent 
parts of which are as follows : 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 
28th day of October, A. D. 1946, by and between 
John A. Jensen, also known as J. A. Jensen and 
Anna Jensen, his wife, hereinafter designated as 
the Seller, and W. H. Mawhinney and Ruth E. 
Mawhinney, his wife, as joint tenants, not as 
tenants in common with full rights of survivor-
ship hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of 
Heber City, Utah. 
WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the 
consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell 
and convey to the buyer, and the buyer for the 
consideration herein mentioned agrees to pur-
chase the following described real property, to-
wit: 
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See attached sheet for legal description (A 
legal description of the premises sold was 
contained on an attached sheet). 
Together with all improvements, fixtures, 
equipment, signs, merchandise and stock now on 
the premises; see attached Itemized List. (This 
inventory listed certain fixtures and hotel and 
tourist cabin equipment, but included no items of 
stock; i.e., food, /used in a resta~trant business.) 
Together with all rights and interest in and 
to the lease dated December 28, 1937, by and be-
tween Melvin D. Close and Hope Close, his wife, 
the parties of the first part and Jack A. Jensen 
and Anna Jensen, his wife, parties of the second 
part, including the 2 story, 3 apartments Green 
Building located on property involved in this 
lease with all furnishings and improvements in-
cluded. 
Said buyer hereby agrees to enter into pos-
session and pay for said described premises the 
sum of Thirty Five Thousand ($35,000.00) dol-
lars, payable at office of Sellers or assigns in 
Heber City, Utah, strictly within the following 
times, to-wit: Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) dollars 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. 
Balance to be paid $200.00 December 1, 1946 and 
$200.00 or more on the first day of each month 
thereafter until this contract, with interest, is 
paid in full. 
Said monthly payments to be applied first to 
the payment of interest and second to the re-
duction of the principal. Interest shall be charged 
from November 1, 1946 on all unpaid portions of 
the purchase price at the rate of 4 per cent per 
annum, payable monthly. Buyer agrees to main-
tain a merchandise inventory of Three Thousand 
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Five Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00) at all times 
during the life of this contract. 
* * * * * 
In the event of a failure to comply with the 
terms hereof by the buyer, or up.on failure to 
make any payments when the same shall become 
due, or within 30 days thereafter, the Seller shall, 
at his option, be released from all obligations in 
law and equity to convey said property and all 
pay1nents which have been made theretofore on 
this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to 
the Seller as liquidated·damages for the non-per-
formance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees 
that the Seller may, at his option, re-enter and 
take possession of said premises without legal 
process a.s in its first and former estate, together 
with all improvements and additions made by the 
Buyer thereon, and the said additions and im-
provem-ents shall remain with the land and be-
come the property of the Seller, the Buyer be-
coming at once a tenant at will of the Seller. It 
is agreed that time is the essence of this agree-
ment. 
* * >j(; * * 
The Seller on receiving the payments herein 
reserved to be paid at the times and in the 
manner above mentioned agrees to execute and 
deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and suffi-
cient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described p·remises free and clear of all 
encumbrances except as herein mentioned and 
except as may have accrued by or through the 
acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at 
his expense, an abstract or a policy of title in-
surance, at the option of the Seller, brought to 
date at time of sale or at time of delivery of deed 
at the option of Buyer. 
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It is hereby expressly understood and agreed 
by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the 
said property in its· present condition and that 
there are no representations, covenants, or agree-
ments between the parties hereto with reference 
to said proprty except as herein specifically set 
forth or attached hereto. 
Abstracts to date. 
* * :)(; * * 
(Signatures of all parties.) 
10. That the aforesaid representation of the defend-
ant John A. Jensen was entirely false in this: That he, 
the said John A. Jensen, had removed therefrom large 
quantities of stock, merchandise, fixtures and equip-
ment. That the following is a list of the equipment which 
the said defendant had removed from said premises 
and which equipment had been on the premises at the 
time of the execution of the earnest money agreement; 
that opposite each item listed below is stated the value 
of said personalty at the time the parties entered into 
the earnest money agreement: (The complaint then con-
tained three pages of i terns of stock, merchandise, equip-
ment and fixtures used in the operation of a restaurant 
and hotel business, including large quantities of food 
and condiments.) 
11. That because of the representation of the defend-
ant John A. Jensen as aforesaid, and because the plain-
tiffs were prevented by the tricks and artifices of the 
said defendants from obtaining a true and correct in-
ventory of the premises, and because the plaintiffs were 
bound by the earnest money agree1nent previously re-
10 
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ferred to to execute said unifortn real estate contract 
at that tiine, plaintiffs were induced to believe, and did 
believe, that all of the said personal property which had 
been on the premises at the tin1e of execution of the 
earnest money agreement \vas still there and that they 
\Vere thereby induced to enter into said uniform real 
estate contract as it was then worded. 
~2. That the defendants, and both of them, W·ell 
knew that the statement of the defendant John A. Jensen 
to the effect that the quantity of the stock was then the 
same as it had been at the time of the execution of the 
earnest money agreement was entirely false and fraudu.,. 
lent; that the defendants and both of them, well knew that 
the said plaintiffs were wholly dependent .upon what the 
defendant John A. Jensen said in reference to the quan-
tity of stock and merchandise on the premises, because 
the defendants, and not the plaintiffs, were familiar 
with the· conduct and stock and merchandise of said 
business and because the defendants tricks ·and ~a.rtifices 
previously referred to in Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 had pre-
vented the plaintiffs from obtaining a true and correct 
inventory of said premises. 
13. That the aforesaid false and fraudulent state-
rnent \Vas made \vith the intent and purpose of the de-
fendants to deceive the plaintiffs and to induce the plain-
tiffs to buy said business aforementioned by misleading 
them into executing the said uniform real estate con-
tract as it was then worded, the defendants well kno"\v-
ing that the plaintiffs were \Yholly relying upon said 
rPpresen ta tion. 
11 
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14. That the plaintiffs, and both of them, were en-
tirely ignorant of the falsity of the statement of the de-
fendant John A. Jensen. 
15. That because the plaintiffs were prevented by 
the tricks and artifices previously referred to from mak-
ing an inventory, and because the plaintiffs were bound 
by said earnest money agreement as aforesaid, they were 
induced .by the misrepresentations of the defendant John 
A. Jensen, to believe that the stock was the same and to 
execute the said real estate contract as it was then word-
ed; that the plaintiffs wholly relied upon said repre-
sentation and believed the same to be true; that they 
'vould not have entered into the said uniform real estate 
contract as it was then worded had they known that the 
vast quantities of stock mentioned above in Paragraph 
10 had been removed therefrom. 
16. That the plaintiffs had no reason to know that 
the defendant John A. Jensen did lie to them; that they 
were strangers to the community, having lived out of the 
county prior to the time of the execution of the earne8t 
money contract; that they were assured by the defen-
dants' attorney, L. C. Montgomery, an attorney l~censed 
to practice law in the State of Utah and practicing in 
Heber City, County of Wasatch, State of Utah, that, 
"John is an honest man", that, "John would keep the 
stock up", and that "I've known him for years"; that 
because of these facts and the facts set forth in Para-
graphs 11, 12, 13 and 15 the plaintiffs 'vere induced to 
rely upon the false representation of the defendants 
that the stock was the same. 
12 
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17. That upon entering into possession of the prenl-
ises after the execution of the uniform real estate con-
tract, the plaintiffs found that the vast quantities of 
personal property outlined in Paragraph 10 above had 
been removed therefron1 to the damage of the plaintiffs 
in the amount of $10,766.00. 
18. That in the purchase money contract, it was 
stated that the plaintiffs were to receive all stock and 
fixtures now on the above described premises, and that 
the said John A. Jensen stated that this included all of 
the items of personal property of every sort and nature 
then on the premises; and that this was the basis of 
agreement of the parties when they entered into the 
earnest money agreement; that because of the fraud of 
the defendants, the uniform real estate contract states 
that the plaintiffs were to receive "·all improvements, 
fixtures, equipment, signs, merchandise -and stock now 
on the premises. See attached itemized list.'' 
19. That whereas this purported to be the same con-
tract as the original earnest money agreement, and it was 
intended by the plaintiffs that this contract should be 
to the same effect as the earnest money agreement, it 
was in effect entirely different from the earnest money 
agreement because of the removal of the vast quanti-
ties of personal property as set out hereinabove. 
20. That the itemized list attached to the real estate 
contract vvas not intended by the parties to include all 
of the itern~ transferred by s-aid contract, because plain-
tiffs had been prevented from completing said inventory 
13 
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by d_efendants, and they, the. defendants, well knew the 
said list was not complete, and it was attached only be-
cause of the representation of the defendant John A. 
Jensen that the status of the stock was the same then 
as it haa been at the time of the earnest money agree-
ment. 
21. That in order that the uniform real estate con-
tract might have the same connotation as the earnest 
money agreem-ent in furtherance of whieh it was executed, 
it should have stated as follows: ''Together with all im-
provements, fixtures, equipment, signs, merchandise and 
stock on the pre1nises on the 14th day of September, 
1946." 
22 .. That the defendants have breached said con-
tract, reformed as asked in that they have failed, neg-
lected and refused to transfer, replace or convey to the 
plaintiffs the property set forth in Paragraph 10. 
* :)!: * * * 
For a second alternative count to plaintiffs' first 
cause of action against the defendants, the plaintiffs 
allege as follows : 
1. Refer to and repeat Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, (), 
7 and 8 of plaintiffs' first count. 
2. That at this time the defendant John A. Jensen 
refused to permit the plaintiffs to enter upon the prem-
ises for the purpose of 1naking such inventory; that he 
refused to go with then1 to make such inventory, and that 
he then and there falsely, fraudulently and deceitfully 
14 
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represented and asserted to the plaintiffs that all of the 
stock which was on the premises at the time of the exe-
cution of the earnest money agreement was still there, 
or had been replaced so that the quantities were the 
same at this tin1e as they had been at the time of the exe-
cution of the earnest money agreement; that at. said 
time the plaintiffs \vere bound by said earnest money 
agreement, previously referred to, to sign the real es;.. 
tate con tract ; and that at said time and said times pre-
viously referred to in Paragraph 6, 7 and 8 of plain-
tiffs' first count, plaintiffs were prevented by the tricks 
and ·artifices of the defendant John A. Jensen from ob-
taining a true inventory of the stock on said premises; 
that the plaintiffs thereupon signed the. uniform real 
estat.e contract. 
3. Refers to and repeats Paragraph 10 o£ plain-
tiffs' first count. 
4. That the plaintiffs would not have entered inio 
said real estate contract as it was worded had they known 
that the vast quantities of stock listed in Paragraph 10 
had been removed therefrom. 
5. Refers to and repeats P:aragra ph 11 of plaintiffs' 
first conn t. 
6. Refers to and repeats Paragraph 12 of plain-
tiffs' first count. 
7. That the aforesaid false and fraudulent state-
ment was made with the intent and purpose of the de-
fendants to deceive the plaintiffs and to induce the plain-
15 
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tiffs to buy said premises by misleading them into exe-
cuting the said uniform real estate contract as it was 
then worded, the defendants well knowing that the plain-
tiffs were wholly relying upon said representation, and 
the defendants contemplating and intending that the 
plaintiffs would sign the said uniform real estate con-
tract as it was then worded in reliance upon said repre-
sentation. 
8. Refers to and repeats Paragraphs 14 and 15 of 
plaintiffs' first count. 
9. That the plaintiffs had no reason to know that 
the defendant John A. Jensen did lie to them; that they 
were strangers to the community, having lived out of the 
community prior to the time of the execution of the pur-
chase money contract; that they were assured by the 
defendants' attorney, L. C. Montgomery, an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and prac-
ticing law in Heber City, County of Wasatch, State of 
Utah, that, "John is an honest man", that "John would 
keep the stock up", and that "I've known him for 
years"; that because of these facts and the f,acts set 
forth in Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' first count ·and Para-
graphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 of this count the plaintiffs were en-
titled to rely, and had a right to rely upon the false repre-
sentation set forth in Paragraph 2 of this count above. 
10. Refers to and repeats Paragraphs 17, 18, 19 
and 20 of plaintiffs' first count. 
11. That as -a natural and probable consequence of 
the misrepresentations of the defendants as set forth 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
herein in Paragraph 2 above, the plaintiffs executed 
said uniform real estate contract and were damaged in 
the ·amount of $10,7.66.00. 
As a third alternative count, plaintiffs allege as 
follows: 
1. Refer to and repeat Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
of the plaintiffs' first count. 
2. That on the 28th day of October, 1946, the plain-
tiffs and defendants assembled for the execution of the 
uniform real estate contract in the lobby of t he hotel 
pr~mises, subject of said contract; that at said time the 
defendant John A. Jensen represented and warranted 
to the plaintiffs that all of the stock that w.a.s on the 
premises at the time of the execution of the earnest 
money agreement was still there or had been replaced so 
that the quantities were the same at that time as they 
had been at the time of the execution of the earnest 
money agreement and thereby induced the plaintiffs to 
purchase the said premises by signing the said uniform. 
real estate con tract. 
3. That the defendants breached the aforesaid re-
presentations and warranty in this: That upon entering 
into possession of the premises after the execution of the 
uniform real estate contract, the plaintiffs found that 
a vast quantity of personal property outlined in Para-
graph 10 of plaintiffs' first count had been ,removed 
therefrom, whereby plaintiffs were damaged in the sum 
of $10,766.00. 
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray as follows: 
1. That said uniform real ·estate contract be re-
formed so as to state: ''Together with all improvements, 
fixtures, eq~ipment, signs, merchandise and stock on the 
premises on the 14th day of September, 1946" so as to 
conform to the expressed intent of the parties as afore-
said. 
2. For the sum of $10,766.00, with intere'St thereon 
at the rate of 6% per annum from the 1st day of Novem-
ber, 1946. 
3. For their costs herein, a reasonable attorney 
fee and for such other and further relief as the court 
may deem just and equitable. 
POINTS RELIED UPON FOR RE\TERSAL 
1. The first count in a.ppllants' complaint states a 
cause of action for reformation of the "Uniform Real 
Estate Contract'' and for damages for breach thereof 
as reformed. 
2. Appellants' second count states a cause of action 
in deceit against respondents. 
3. Appellants' third count states a cause of action 
for breach of warranty against respondents. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. 
This first count in appellants' complaint states a 
cause of.: action for reformation of the "Uniform Real 
Estate Contract'' and for damages for breach thereof 
as reformed. 
The basis for the equitable relief of reformation is 
set out in 45 Am. Jur~ "Reformation of Instruments", 
Section 7, Page 586. I quote : 
"Inasmuch as the relief. sought in reforming 
a written instrument is. 'to make it conform to 
the real agreement or intention of the parties, a 
definite intention or agreement on which the 
minds of the parties had met* must have pre-
existed the instrument in question ... The prior 
agreement or intention must, of course, differ 
.from the instrument in question or there would 
be no ground for relief ... and it must be further 
shown that the difference was due to fraud or 
mistake. If no prior agreement or intention 
existed, then the only remedy is rescission.'' 
·*Italics ours. 
Numerous Utah cases have dealt 'vith situations 
warranting reformation or rescission, and these opin-
ions clearly indicate that reformation of a writing which 
was executed to record a prior oral agreement or to 
complete the details of a prior written agreement will 
be allowed if the requisite facts for relief from fraud 
or mistake are present. Reforn1ation was granted in 
Nordfors vs. Knight et ux., 60 P. 2d 115, Cram et al vs. 
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Reynolds et oal., 55 Utah 384, 186 Plac. 100, and in Garnet 
vs. Thomas et al., 75 P. 2d 168. 
Instruments are rescinded rather than reformed 
where there has been no prior intention to be implement-
ed by writing in question, though the other elements of 
a reformation case are pre'Sent. This was done in Adam-
son et ux. vs. Brockbank et al., 185 P. 2d 264, Stuck et al 
vs. Delta Land and Water Company, 63 Utah 490, 277 P. 
791, and in Bennett et al. vs. Bowen et al., 65 Utah 444, 
238 P. 240. 
Clearly this rule applies to the case at hand. The 
first agreement-the so-called ''Earnest Money Agree-
ment" (Paragraph 3 of Amended Complaint, Supra 
P. 2) stated all of the principal terms of the contract 
and further indicated that a subsequent contract would 
be made ''on the approved form of the Salt Lake Real 
Estate Board". It was obviously intended that the sec-
ond contract would be entirely consistent with the "Earn-
est Money Agreement". 
The allegations show that the second contract (Para· 
graph 9 of the amended complaint, Supra P. 16) was in 
terms entirely consistent with the first contract except 
for the inconsistency induced by the fraud. They further 
show that the parties never manifested any intention· 
of altering the terms of the first agreement in the second 
agreement. 
Of course, the flaw sought to be eliminated by re-
formation must have been caused by actionable fraud 
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or mutual mistake. We are concerned here with fraud. 
The requirements for actionable fraud in Utah for cases 
· seeking reformation, rescission, or in tort based on de-
ceit, are set forth in Stuck et al. vs. Delta Land and 
Water Company, 63 Utah 490; 227 Pac. 791 as follows: 
(at Page 505.) 
''It may be stated generally that the elements 
of actual fraud consist of: (1) A representation; 
(2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; ( 4) the 
speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance 
of its truth; ( 5) his intent that it should be acted 
upon by the person and in the ma~ner reasonably 
contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) his reliance upon its truth; (8) his 
right to rely thereon; (9) his consequent and 
proximate injury.'' 
, 
The main contention of respondents in their argu-
ment to· the trial judge was that appellants had no right 
to rely on the representations of the respondents, that-
they were negligent to do so and were, therefore, not 
entitled to relief. We submit that little question can be 
raised as to the sufficiency of the allegations to meet 
the other eight requirements outlined above. 
Respondents cited the case of Rushton vs. Hallett, 
8 Utah 277, as sustaining their point. In this case plain-
tiffs agreed to sell to defendants two certain tracts of 
land between which was a third tract of land which had 
at one time been purportedly conveyed to the City, but, 
as claimed by plaintiffs, such conveyance had never been 
completed. The defendants prepared first a deed des-
cribing the two outside pieces of land. A short while 
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later, they prepared a second deed which they presented 
to the plaintiffs and represented to be the same as the 
first. However, its description covered the three tracts, 
including the center lot. It also included this exception : 
''But there is nevertheless excepted from the foregoing 
the street heretofore deeded to s!a.id city, and embraced in 
said last mentioned lot 1, section 11, township 1 afore-
said.'' Plaintiffs allege that defendants fraudulently mis-
represented to the1n that the second deed was the same 
as the first. 
The court denied reformation, stating two bases: 
I quote from Page 283 : 
'' ... If the ground can be identified, the title 
does not pass to the defendants, and, if no street 
existed at all, the title to the disputed· ground 
still remains in the plaintiffs, and they have no 
cause for complaint against the defendants .. The 
question as to who owns the land is between them 
and the city ... The plaintiffs were in possession; 
still are in possession, knew all about how it lay, 
and its boundaries. The parties were at arm's 
length. No relation of confidence or trust existed 
between them; and, if the plaintiffs were imposed 
upon, it was their own neglect.'' 
Since the circumstances in the Rushton case and this 
case as to knowledge, access to information, etc., are dis-
similar, it could not be said to be controlling. The numer-
ous other Utah cases more clearly spell out the limita-
tions of the "right to rely" doctrine. We contend that 
they reveal these considerations: (1) That negligence 
will not bar relief in fraud cases nearly so readily as in 
mutual 1nistake cases, and (2) that in fraud cases only 
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the most extre1ne negligence will bar the defrauded party 
fro1n relief. 
In Garner v. Thomas et al., 75 P. 2d 168 and in Nord-
fors YS. Knight et ux., 60 P. 2d 1115, relief was granted 
based on mutual mistake. In the Garner case the injured 
party had failed to read a deed she signed. In the Nord-
fors case, the plaintiff had failed to have a survey made. 
rrhese cases indicate how little consideration has been 
given the ''negligence'' doctrine in the absence of cir-
cutnstances of estoppel, rights of third parties or laches. 
The only cases denying reformation on ground of 
negligence which counsel for appellant has been able to 
find are George vs. Fritsch Loan and Trust Company, 
·69 Utah 460, · 256 Pac. 400, and Federal Land B·ank of 
Berkely vs. Salt Lake Valley Sand and Gravel Company 
et al., 89 P. 2d 791. In the George case the injured party 
drew the. document and acquiesced in it while .the other 
party spent a large sum in reliance upon it. In the Fed-
eral Land Bank case the evidence failed on the question of 
mistake. 
Even Judge Wolfe's dictum in the case of Garner 
vs. Thomas et al. (on petition for rehearing) 78 P. 2d 
529, merely states that the pleading must contain "an 
allegation that the (injured party) ..... had not been 
guilty of negligence in signing the mortgage," which re-
quirement '"·e submit \Ve have met, and furthermore 
he \vas discussing a mutual mistake situation. 
Numerous Utah cases dealing with fraud situations 
have gran ted relief. In Crain et ·al vs. Reynolds et · al., 
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55 Utah 384, 186 P. 100, the parties had agreed to execute 
a contract and deed transferring certain land, including 
11 shares of water. (These were shares in an incorpo-
rated water company). When they got together and had 
the papers drawn up, the defendant noticed that the 
water shares were not mentioned in the contract or the 
deed. He then asked his attorney if they went with the 
land and- was informed that they did not, but that he 
should transfer them. He stated then that he would let 
them sweat a little while. When later on in the evening 
the water shares were demanded by the plaintiffs, he 
stated that he had signed enough papers and would 
sign no more that day. Thereafter, the action was prose-
cuted for the reformation of the contract and deed to in-
clude the water shares. 
Reform·ation was granted, the Court stating as fol-
lows: (At Page 386) 
"~utual mistakes can be corrected, and courts 
will reform a contract so as to express what the 
parties actually agreed upon and make it express 
the terms upon which the minds of both parties 
met. The law on the subject is well established 
in this jurisdiction.'' 
(It should be noted that in this case we have on one 
side a mistake which might have easily been said to be 
due to the parties' negligence, but on the other hand, the 
knowledge of that Inistake by the other party which he 
fraudulently 'vithheld from the persons who would suf-
fer from it.) 
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In Stuck et al. vs. Delta Land and Water Company, 
63 Utah 490, 227 P. 791, plaintiffs after seeing certain 
circulars distributed by defendant in California, came 
to Utah to vie'v certain lands for which defendant was 
seeking settlers to whon1 defendant comp,a.ny proposed 
to sell certain rights. In its circular the com.pany repre-
sented that the Pahvant Valley (the lands for which de-
fendant "-as seeking settlers) was a thoroughly proven 
general farming district. Defendant's agents took the 
plaintiffs to certain of the cultiv~ated lands which were 
farmed in Pahvant Valley and introduced them to many 
of the farmers, all of whom spoke in a laudatory manner 
concerning the property. Then the agents conducted 
the plaintiffs to a tract of unoccupied land in the north-
ern part of the district where there 'vere two pieces of 
land open for entry. 
While plaintiffs examined the unoccupied lands, they 
discovered in some places thereon a white substance 
'vhich they t·hought was alkali. When they asked defen-
dant's agents about this, they were assured that it was 
not ~alkali but gypsum and was not injurious to the land, 
and that the soil had been duly tested. Relying there-
on the plaintiffs entered upon the land, paid the ap.p·ro-
priate fee to the State and purchased, for a considerable 
sum, the necessary water rights. Their crops, however, 
turned out to be an almost total failure because of ex-
cessive quantities of alkali on the land. 
The trial court awarded damages on the basis of the 
allegations and proof, and the Supreme Court affirmed 
·the judgment, sta.ting as follows: (At Page 506) 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''Appellant also quotes the following excerpt 
from Black on Rescission and Cancellation, -Para-
graph 113: 
'It is a rule of great antiquity, and sup-
ported by a great body of authorities that a 
person about to enter into a contract or assume 
an obligation should exercise reasonable care 
and prudence in the matter of accepting at their 
face value representations concerning the sub-
ject matter made to him by the opposite party; 
and, although the representation were false and 
fraudulent, and he was deceived by them and 
misled to his injury, yet he cannot rescind or 
repudiate his con tract on that ground, if it ap-
pears that he might have discovered their 
falsity by mere inspection of the subject, or by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence in refer-
ring to sources of information which were 
equally open to him as to the other party. 
There are exceptions to this rule . . . where 
t,he matter was exclusively within the knowl-
edge of one of them, where an examination of 
the subject-matter would require unusual pains, 
expense, or trouble, and involve special train-
ing or technical knowledge, w.nd so on.' ''=!(' 
And at Page 512: 
. . . ''As far as the question of alkali is con-
cerned, plaintiffs testified they were unfamiliar 
with alkali, especially on desert land. Whether 
or not a given substance is alkali can only be de-
termined by experience or technical knowledge. 
Plaintiffs testified that when they inquired of 
these selling agents as to whether a certain sub-
stance seen upon the land they afterwards en-
tered was alkali, the agents informed the1n it was 
not alkali but gypsun1 and was not deleterious 
to the land. They also informed plaintiffs that 
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every 40 acres of the land had been tested and 
that there was no alkali. These statements, to-
gether with the fact that it involved a question 
of technical knowledge, undoubtedly brought the 
question within the doctrine of the authorities 
cited, especially Black on Rescission, Paragraph 
113,* supra. Nor does the fact tha,t plaintiffs 
themselves made some investigation of the project 
arid went on the land alter the rule. '' 
*Italics ours. 
In Bennett et al. vs. Bowen et al., 65 Utah 444, 238 
P. 240, the defendants had attended a certain Chautauqua 
lecture in Logan, Utah, and as they were leaving the 
hall, they were confronted by Plaintiff, W. G. Rucken-
brod, who had in hand a piece of folded paper, the 
exposed side of which was blank. He asked each of them 
if they enjoyed the lectures and if they wanted them 
to return and requested the defendants to sign their 
names to the blank paper, and represented to them 
that it was for the purpose of ascertaining their interest 
in and good will for the Chautauqua organization and 
a desire that the association should return to Logan for 
the season of 1923, the following year. Actually the 
paper on the other side contained a written guaranty 
contract. The defendant signed the paper in reliance 
upon the statements and did not intend to enter into 
any such con tract. 
From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendants 
appealed. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice 
Thurman, reversed the trial court and held that the 
defendants were not liable on their contract. Plaintiff 
contended that the defendants were negligent in signing 
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the contract and quoted from Greenfield's Estate, 14 
Penn., Page 489, the following:-
''If a party who can read . . . will not read a 
deed put before him for execution, or if, being 
unable to read, will not demand to have it read or 
explained to him, he is guilty of supine negli-
gence, which, I take it, is not the subject of pro-
tection, either in equity or at law." 
In dealing with the doctrine advanced in this case, 
the Supreme Court stated as follows: (At Page 453) 
''There may be some foundation for that doc-
trine, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation 
or concealment; but where one or more of these 
occur it is not the law. Approximately 6,000 years 
ago, when Cain's hands were reeking with the 
blood of his brother Abel, he was asked the ques-
tion, 'Where is Abel, thy brother~' Cain answered, 
'I know not; am I my brother's keeper~' Human 
nature has not changed. The idea is still preva-
lent that our brother must look out for himself. 
It will not always do, however, in the adminis-
tration of justice. We are our brother's keeper 
to the extent that, if, in a business transaction, 
we mislead him by fals·e representations or con-
cealment, to his injury, we are liable for the con-
sequences of our wrongful conduct. In Page on 
Contracts (2d Ed.) Paragraph 233, it is said: 
'If the party defrauded could read, has a 
chance to read, and omits to read the instru-
ment, relying on the adversary party's state-
ment of its contents, the instrument should on 
principle be treated as void, as between the 
parties thereto, since it should be no defense 
for the· party who is guilty of the fraud to say 
that the other party was negligent in believing 
him. The majority of the courts take this view 
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of such cases, and hold such contract void, in 
spite of the negligence of the defrauded 
party.' '' 
In The Beaver Drug Company vs. Hatch, 61 Utah 
597, 217 P. 695, the defendant sold to plaintiff corpora-
tion a certain drug store business, including stock, for 
an agreed sum. During the negotiations for the pur-
chase of the property, the defendant, who for ten years 
prior to the purchase was the owner and sole manager 
of the business, represented to the plaintiff's incorpo-
rators that an inventory of the stock, merchandise and 
drugs would total at least $4,000.00. In reliance upon 
these representations, which the defendant knew were 
untrue, the plaintiff corporation purchased the drug 
store. Thereafter, an inventory of the stock was per-
formed which indicated that it was worth only $2,834.59. 
In this action plaintiff sought to recover the difference 
between the inventory value and the represented value; 
i.e. $1,166.41. The District Court awarded a judgment 
for this sum to the plaintiff and the Supreme Court 
sustained this award. 
In Adamson, et ux. vs. Brockbank et al., 185 P. 
2d 264, a common grantor of a large tract of ground 
sold ten acres from the western and lower portion of 
the tr.a.ct to the plaintiff for farming purposes. For 
many years there had been an irrigation ditch running 
the length of the eastern portion of the tract, and this 
ditch was essential to the irrigation of the ten· acres 
purchased by the plaintiff. Later on the grantor sold 
to the defendants the eastern and higher portion of 
the land. Thereafter the defendants erected a consider-
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able number of dwelling houses (which they called 
Columbia Village), and in the process of this, they 
destroyed the irrigation ditch. 
After the defendants had purchased their portion 
of the land, but before they destroyed the ditch, the 
title insurance company discovered a discrepancy in 
the boundary line between the defendants' and the plain-
tiff's property. Upon discovering this, Defendant Allen 
Brockbank prepared a quitclaim deed and inportuned 
the .plaintiffs to sign it. They at first refused to sign 
the deed, but subsequently, after a number of visits 
by Defendant Allen Brockbank :and after he had re-
peatedly informed plaintiffs that the sole purpose of 
the deed was to clear up the discrepancy in the boundary, 
plaintiffs executed the deed. No discussion had been had 
with respect to their relinquishing their rights to the 
use of the ditch. 
Thereafter plaintiff sued defendants for damages 
for the destruction of the ditch and also asked that 
the quitclaim deed insofor as it purported to eras~ 
plaintiff's right in the ditch running across defendants' 
land be rescinded. Defendants, of course, claimed that 
the quitclaim deed had not only corrected the boundary 
but had also erased plaintiff's easement. 
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice 
Latimer, upheld the trial court in rescinding the quit-
claim deed. To indicate the standard of care required 
to entitle plaintiffs to rely upon defendants' representa-
tions as to the effect of the deed and Defendant Brock-
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
bank's intention in obtaining it, the Court (at page 
276) quoted from Black, ''Rescission of Contracts,'' 
Paragraph 68, Page 172, as follo,vs: 
''The circumstances must have been such as 
to justify the defrauded party in relying on the 
representation, as a basis of his own decision or 
action, without making an independent investi~ 
gation of its truth or falsity, or he must have 
been in some way dissuaded or prevented from 
making a sufficient investigation ... ''* 
In applying this doctrine to the case at hand, the 
Court stated: (also at Page 276} 
''In considering the last of the principles 
above quoted, it is sufficient to state that appel-
lant Brockbank, by virtue of his superior knowl-
edge; by his action of taking respondents to the 
courthouse and pointing out the plats which re-
vealed the existing discrepancy; by assuring re-
spondents he would satisfy their mortgagee that 
the quitclaim deed was only for the purpose of 
clearing up the discrepancy; by obtaining clear-
ances from the mortgagee of respondents' prop-
erty; and by having a representa~tive of the title 
insurance company further assure them of the 
necessity and purpose of the deed; all these were 
such circumstances as justified respondents in 
relying on Brockbank's represent~ations without 
making an independent investigation.'' 
*Italics ours. 
These cases might warrant denial of relief where 
a party simply fails to read a deed. But consider the 
following circumstances alleged in the amended com-
plaint which placed appellants in a most disadvanta-
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geous position in relation to respondents as far as 
information, or opportunity to obtain it, were concerned: 
a. Appellants were newcomers to the community 
:and to this business and were unf.amiliar with the 
volume of stock turnover or the quantity of stock 
(Paragraph 2). 
b. Since they were not given a right to inspect 
the premices in the Earnest Money Agreement, if 
they had refused to execute the second agreement 
unless permitted to inventory, they would have for-
feited their down payment and their rights under the 
contract (Paragraph 3). 
c. When Appellant Wilbur Mawhinney went on-
to the premises to inventory the stock, etc., he was 
stalled by Respondent John A. Jensen, who said 
he was too busy (Paragraph '6). 
d. At the time of the execution of the second 
contract, Respondent John A. Jensen acted greatly 
insulted that his word should be questioned (Para-
graph 9). Furthermore, appellants were assured 
by respondents' attorney that "John in an honest 
man . . . (and) . . . would keep the stock up 
I've known him for years." (Paragraph 16). 
Considering these facts in comparison with the 
Beaver Drug case (Supra P. 29) this case appears much 
stronger. In that case the defrauded party lacked 
access for about the same reason as here. But the 
actice steps to eonceal and d1:ssuade were lacking there~. 
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In the Adamson case (Supra P. 29) active steps to 
conceal were taken (as in the Bennett case, Supra 
P.), but if Adamson had consulted an attorney, he 
would have been warned of the possibility of the loss 
of his easement. 
It n1ay be claimed that appellants are resorting to 
parol evidence to support their position. .As stated in 
Daly vs. Old et al., 99 P. 460 (At Page 463): 
''If the intention of the parties cannot readily 
be ascertained from the language alone, then the 
court must have recourse to the situation, condi-
tions, and circumstances which affected the par-
ties, and from the languag.e when considered in 
the light that those matters afford determine the 
real intention of the parties." 
To determine the ''Stock and fixtures now on the 
property" as mentioned in the Earnest Money Agree-
ment, obviously parol proof would be necessary. 
The second contract refers to ''all improvements, 
fixtures, equipment, signs, merchandise and stock now 
on the premises ; see attached itemized list.'' This list 
does not purport to include any restaurant ''stock'' 
and so is patently not complete. Again reference to 
parol evidence is necessary to determine the full facts 
and intention of the parties. 
However, the main rule to consider in relation to 
this problem is that the parol evidence rule may not 
be invoked to uphold fraudulently induced provisions 
in a con tract. 
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In 24 Am. Jur. (Fraud and Deceit), Section 267), 
P-ages 103-104 and 105 are found the following state-
ments (with cases cited) : 
"The fact that a contract is in writing does 
not preclude the introduction of ·evidence to show 
that a material stipulation therein was founded 
on the misrepresentations and fraud of one of 
the parties, or inserted by fraud, or that a ma-
terial stipulation was omitted on account of 
fraud .. . 
" ... The reduction of an agreement to writ-
ing is not at all conclusive against fraud in the 
contract, and the admission of extrinsic evidence 
which bears clearly upon the existence of fraud 
sought to be ·established for the purpose of avoid-. 
ing the effect of the written agreement-as by 
rescission, r~formation, or the establishment of a 
trust-or as the basis of a tort action, does not 
constitute an attempt to vary the terms of the 
agreement by parol. It was never intended that 
the parol evidence rule he used as a shield to 
prevent the proof of fraud, or that a person 
could arrang·e to have an agreement obtained by 
him through fraud exercised upon the other con-
tracting party reduced to writing and formally 
executed, and thereby deprive the courts of the 
power to prev·ent him from reaping the benefits 
of his chicanery. 
. . . The general rule that parol or extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to prove that a written 
contract was procured by fraud applies . . . 
whether the evidence offered relates to fraud in 
the ommission of a material provision or to fraud 
in the insertion of, or a misrepresentation con-
cerning, a certain term in the instrument, or 
whether the evidence offered directly contra-
dicts the writing or merely covers a point not 
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referred to in the writing, and in sp~ite of special 
provisions in the contract which purport to limit 
the application of parol evidence by stating that 
the writing contains all the terms involved and the 
representations made, or that the written con-
tract shall be the sole evidence of th·e transaction, 
or that each contracting party relies and acts up-
on only his knowledge and not upon the repre-
sentations of his adversary.' 
So in Strike vs. White et al., 63 P. 2d 600, where 
this court held that the parol evidence rule precluded 
the introduction of certain oral testimony in an action 
upon a contract, the court said: (At Page 602) 
''If the contract does not express the inten-
tion of the parties, it may by proper p~roceedings 
be reformed." 
II. 
Appellants' second count states a cause of action 
In deceit against respondents. 
The Utah cases do not seem to draw a distinction 
between the elements of actionable fraud necessary 
in deceit cases and those necessary in reformation and 
recission cases. Therefore, the discussion under the 
first point covers this point. 
The Beaver Drug Company case (Supra P. 29) 
seems entirely analagous to this case on the deceit 
question and seems ample authority on the point. 
III. 
Appellants' third count states a cause of a.ction 
for breach of warranty against respondents. 
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Our Statute (81-1-12, U.C.A. 1943) ·defines an ex-
press 'varranty. We quote: 
''Any affirmation of fact or any promise by 
the seller r·ela ting to the goods is an express 
warranty, if the natural tendency of such affir-
mation or promise is to induce the buyer to pur-
chase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the 
goods relying ther·eon. No affirmation of the 
value of the goods, nor any statement purporting 
to be a statement of the seller's opinion only, 
shall be considered as a warranty.'' 
This has been amplified by the case of Nielson vs. 
Hermansen, 166 P. 2d, 536. We quote from page 537: 
'' . . . . an affirmation of fact that is a repre-
sentation, is a warranty and not merely evi-
dence of a warranty, if its natural tendency is to 
induce the buyer to purchase the goods and the 
buyer thus induced does purchase them. Words 
of warranty such as ''I guarantee or I warrant'' 
are not neeessary for en express warranty; a 
positive affirmation of the fact is enough to ren-
der the seller liable. The representation of fact 
which would naturally tend to and does induce 
a bargain is a warranty. The fact that the defen-
dant did not intend to warrant is no defense if 
he did make a statement which brings him within 
the statute." 
In 46 Am. J ur. ( S·ales), Section 324, Page 505, 
Affirmations as to Quantity are dealt with as follows: 
"Ordinarily. it would seem that a statement 
by the seller as to the weight or quantity of spe-
cific commodities sold is to be regarded as a 
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statement or expression of opinion rather than 
an assertion of fact, and is not to be deemed a 
warranty, and this is especially true when the 
statement is qualified by the word 'about' or the 
like. If, however, the circumstances show that it is 
the intention ·of the parties that a. statement of 
this c.haracter is a statement of a fact on whic.h 
the buyer should rely, it is treated a.s a warranty, 
and where goods shipped to the buyer are invoiced 
as ·.containing a certain quantity, this is to be treat-
ed as a. warranty.'' 
Respondents argued before the District Judge that 
the parol evidence rule bars evidence to show the state-
ment and shortage, relying upon the provisions in the 
second contract "See attached list". However, this 
list did not purport to include items of restaurant 
''stock'' and ''merchandise'', and so resort may be 
had to parol evidence to explain what items constituted 
said ''stock'' and ., 'merchandise' '. (See 46 Am. J ur. 
(Sales) Section 316, Page 499, and discussion Supra 
P. 33). 
By the same token, the disclaimer provision of 
the second contract that "there are no representations, 
covenants or agreements between the parties hereto 
with reference to said property except as herein spe-
cifically set forth or attached hereto'' does not bar 
recovery upon this warranty, because the. written con-
tract has left the quantity of stock uncertain and resort 
must be had to the oral statement as to quantity to 
complete the agreement. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the District Court 
erred in sustaining respondents·' demurrer. We submit 
that a cause of action was stated alternately in either 
the count for reformation, the count on deceit or the 
count on breach of warranty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN M. HATCH and 
B. Z. KASTLER, JR. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
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